Abstract: This paper contributes to the policy evaluation literature by developing new strategies to study alternative policy rules. We compare optimal rules to simple rules within canonical monetary policy models. In our context, an optimal rule represents the solution to an intertemporal optimization problem in which a loss function for the policymaker and an explicit model of the macroeconomy are specified. We define a simple rule to be a summary of the intuition policymakers and economists have about how a central bank should react to aggregate disturbances. The policy rules are evaluated under minimax and minimax regret criteria. These criteria force the policymaker to guard against a worst-case scenario, but in different ways. Minimax makes the worst possible model the benchmark for the policymaker, while minimax regret confronts the policymaker with uncertainty about the true model. Our results indicate that the case for a model-specific optimal rule can break down when uncertainty exists about which of several models is true. Further, we show that the assumption that the policymaker's loss function is known can obscure policy trade-offs that exist in the short, medium, and long run. Thus, policy evaluation is more difficult once it is recognized that model and preference uncertainty can interact.
Introduction
This paper contributes to the policy evaluation literature by developing new strategies to study alternative policy rules. We are interested in assessing the case that can be made for optimal rules as opposed to simple rules for policy. Our specific focus is on monetary policy rules. In our context, an optimal rule represents the solution to an intertemporal optimization problem in which a loss function for the policymaker and an explicit model of the macroeconomy are specified. We define a simple rule as a summary of the intuitions policymakers and economists have about how a central bank should react to aggregate disturbances.
Simple monetary policy rules have evolved since Friedman's classic (1948) presentation of the k% money growth rule. Modern versions of simple monetary policy rules typically embody a notion of "leaning against the wind".
2 A central bank plays an active role in stabilizing macroeconomic aggregates when it works to offset adverse shocks. The canonical modern example of a simple policy heuristic is Taylor's rule (1993) , in which the Federal funds rate rises in response to output relative to trend and by more than one-for-one with the inflation rate. Taylor's rule is motivated by the notion that a central bank should attempt to reverse aggregate demand shocks, whereas aggregate supply shocks should be allowed to operate unhindered in the economy.
The distinction between optimal and simple rules has taken on particular significance in recent debates over the desirability of inflation targeting, as exemplified in the competing views expressed in Svensson (2003) and McCallum and Nelson (2005) .
The latter paper takes particular interest in the claim made by Svensson that targeting rules are preferred to instrument rules because the former embodies the restrictions intertemporal optimality places on the solution to the optimal policy problem. 3 As a theoretical matter, McCallum has shown that in principle an instrument rule may arbitrarily well approximate a targeting rule, so long as the rules are conditioned on the same information set. Nonetheless, Svensson's claim has force when targeting rules are compared to some classes of simple rules (e.g., Taylor rules) in which we are interested. 4 This paper questions the case for optimal rules at two levels. First, we consider the role model uncertainty plays in vitiating the superiority of optimal to simple rules. As argued by McCallum and Nelson (2005) 5 , the optimality of a rule with respect to a given economic environment begs the question of its evaluation when the true model of the economy is not known. Our paper evaluates this issue by comparing model-specific optimal rules with simple alternatives. Second, we compare simple and optimal rules from the perspective of frequency-specific effects on uncertainty. Conventional policy assessments assume that the preferences of the policymaker are summarized by the variances of the aggregates under study. As we discuss below, such preferences ignore the disparate short-, medium-and long-run affects of policy. Since Brock and Durlauf (2004, 2005) and show that the choice of a policy rule yields a frequency by frequency variance tradeoff, we argue that these tradeoffs should be reported to a policymaker, to account for different preferences with respect to fluctuations at different cycles. We believe that such comparisons contain useful information for policymakers.
Our analysis is in the spirit of Friedman (1948) who explicitly grounds his arguments for tying monetary policy to a fixed money growth rule on information limitations facing a central bank. Friedman concludes his analysis with …I should like to emphasize the modest aim of the proposal. It does not claim to provide full employment…It does not claim to eliminate entirely cyclical fluctuations in output and employment. Its claim to serious consideration is that it provides a stable framework of fiscal and monetary action, that it largely eliminates the uncertainty…of discretionary actions by government authorities…It is not perhaps a proposal that one would consider at all optimum if our knowledge of the fundamental causes of cyclical fluctuations were 4 Notice that the comparison of targeting rules to simple instrument rules renders moot the claim that targeting rules are more transparent than instrument rules. 5 See McCallum (1988 McCallum ( , 1999 for early discussions of model uncertainty and monetary policy that broadly study many of the questions we wish to consider.
considerably greater than I think them to be; it is a proposal that involves minimum reliance on uncertain and untested knowledge. (pg. 263) Model uncertainty has, due to the pioneering work of Hansen and Sargent ((2003) and especially (2007)) on robustness, become a major feature of current research. 6 In this paper we follow an approach developed in Levin and Williams (2003) and West (2003, 2006) to evaluate policies in the presence of model uncertainty.
The idea of this approach is to first construct a model space that includes all candidate models for the economy, evaluate policies for each of the candidate models, and then determine how to draw policy influences given the fact that the true model is unknown.
This approach differs from the usual robustness analysis in that we do not focus on model misspecification which is measured local to a given baseline model. Rather, our approach acknowledges the global character of model uncertainty.
Given a model space, it is necessary to determine how to aggregate information on rule performance across the different models. In this paper, we consider non-Bayesian approaches that are based on minimax and minimax regret criteria. These approaches involve guarding against "worst case scenarios", but do so in different ways that we formalize below. Relative to the Bayesian approach described below, neither minimax nor minimax regret requires the policymaker to take a stance on model space priors in order to compute posterior model probabilities.
Our analysis does not address the question of the design of optimal rules in the presence of model uncertainty. We regard this as an important, but distinct question from understanding the sensitivity of rules to model uncertainty. We believe our exercise is useful because it provides insights into how to evaluate the performance of rules in the presence of model uncertainty that cannot be explicitly described in advance. There are fundamental conceptual questions involved in thinking about policy effects when one cannot specify the support of the uncertainty faced by a policymaker. Nevertheless, we believe insights into this difficult problem are found from understanding how rules perform within a model space when, by construction, the rules fail to account for model uncertainty. Our approach to non-Bayesian decision theory follows Hansen and Sargent (who focus on minimax evaluation). Since we operate within somewhat different model spaces, it requires additional justification for our approach.
In terms of substantive conclusions, we find that for some standard univariate macroeconomic models there exist significant limitations to model-specific optimal rules.
When model uncertainty is restricted to the case where the target variable (inflation in our example) is either entirely forward-looking or backwards-looking, minimax and minimax regret often choose rules that do not feedback on the lagged instrument variable (i.e., the output gap) when the policymaker aims to minimize the total unconditional variance of the target. In contrast, the optimal rule for the forward looking model is favored when attention is restricted to the higher frequencies, even when the true model is uncertain.
When we consider a hybrid model space, in which the relative weights of the backwardsand forward-looking components are unknown, the comparison of a model-specific optimal rule (based on the model where each component has equal weight) and a rule of thumb reveals that the model-specific rule is preferred when one focuses on overall variance and higher frequencies, whereas the rule of thumb is preferred for lower frequencies. Taken as a whole, these results indicate how the case for a model-specific optimal rule can breakdown when one relaxes the assumption that the true model is known as well as the assumption that the appropriate loss function is known.
Section 2 describes our basic framework for assessing model uncertainty. Section 3 discusses the evaluation of frequency-specific effects of policies. Section 4 applies our general ideas to policy evaluation when there is uncertainty about the respective importance of backwards-and forward-looking elements to the inflation process. Section 5 provides summary and discussion of future research directions. A Technical Appendix which provides derivations is available from the authors upon request.
Model uncertainty: basic ideas
At an abstract level, the issue of model uncertainty is easily described. Suppose that a policymaker faces a choice among a set P of candidate policies. Given , which Θ 4 captures whatever features of the economy matter to the policymaker, a policymaker experiences a loss associated with those features ( ).
The features defined by Θ are not, for interesting cases, a deterministic function of a policy and so are in general described by a conditional probability
where we explicitly allow the state of the economy to depend on the policy choice, p , the available data, d, and the model of the economy that is assumed to apply, m. Data dependence in this conditional probability may incorporate both direct dependence, as occurs in an autoregression, where forecasts depend on past realizations, or uncertainty about parameters. For simplicity, we measure losses as positive, so a policymaker wishes to minimize (1) by choosing a policy to affect (2). Our goal in the analysis is to relax the assumption that the policymaker knows the correct model of the economy, m.
Rather, we assume that the policymaker knows that the correct model lies in a model space M. This space reflects uncertainty about the appropriate theoretical and functional form commitments needed to allow quantitative analysis of the effects of a policy.
In this paper we focus on non-Bayesian decision criteria with respect to model uncertainty. 7 In order to understand why we take this route, recall that the standard Bayesian solution to the optimal policy problem solves (
7 Hansen and Sargent (2007) provide an extensive discussion on non-Bayesian approaches to macroeconomic analyses of the type we explore. Their analysis develops a comprehensive theory of robust decisionmaking. See also Brock, Durlauf and West (2003) , whose formulation of model uncertainty and rule comparison we follow here.
where ( m d µ ) denotes the posterior probability that model m is the correct one.
Recalling that
the Bayesian approach thus requires explicit assignment of model priors. The assignment of these priors is problematic since a researcher rarely possesses any meaningful prior knowledge from which priors may be constructed. The default prior in the model uncertainty literature assigns equal probabilities to all elements of the model space; but as discussed in Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003) 8 We do not address the issue of how to interpret these probabilities when none of the models is true. This is a deep and unresolved problem; see Key, Perrichi and Smith (1998) for some efforts to address. 9 The Bayesian solution to model uncertainty involves model averaging, an idea suggested in Leamer (1978) and developed in detail in Raftery, Madigan, and Hoeting (1997) . 10 Freedman (1991) matters is that the evidence of ambiguity aversion suggests a tendency to guard against the worst case scenario with respect to models; this idea is developed in Hansen and Sargent (2007) and Brock, Durlauf and West (2003) .
Non-Bayesian decision criteria attempt to avoid dependence of inferences on model probabilities guarding against especially bad outcomes. At an intuitive level, these approaches abandon the search for optimal rules (in the Bayesian decision theory sense) in favor of good rules, where good is equated with the notion that the rule works relatively well regardless of which model is true. The best known approach is the minimax criterion, proposed by Wald (1950) , under which a policy is chosen to minimize the expected loss under the least favorable model (relative to that rule) in the model set.
The minimax policy choice is, for our formulation
The minimax approach has been pioneered by Hansen and Sargent for macroeconomic contexts and forms the basis of the literature on robustness analysis. From the perspective of the economic theory literature, versions of minimax have been justified by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Epstein and Wang (1994) .
A standard criticism of the minimax criterion is that it is inappropriately conservative because it assumes the worst case possible in assessing policies. The force of this criticism, in our view, depends on whether the policy choice is driven by a relatively implausible model. This of course leads back to the question of model probabilities, the reasons for eschewing we have already given. Nevertheless, the extreme conservatism of minimax leads us to consider an alternative criterion: minimax regret.
Minimax regret was originally proposed by Savage (1951) 
Regret therefore measure the loss incurred by a policy given a model relative to what would have incurred under the optimal policy for that model. The minimax regret policy is correspondingly defined by
Seminal work by Manski (2005) has generated a great deal of attention in the microeconometrics literature for minimax regret. 11 As far as we know, minimax regret has not been used to study macroeconomic questions in general, let alone with respect to questions associated with policy evaluation.
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The minimax regret criterion's appeal for policy comparison may be seen in the following example. Suppose that there are two policies and two possible models. For policy 1, there is a loss under model 1 of 22 and a loss under model 2 of 21. For policy 2, the losses under models 1 and 2 are 23 and 3 respectively. Under the minimax criterion, policy 1 is chosen since the maximum loss under it is 22 versus a maximum loss of 23 under policy 2. Under minimax regret policy 2 is chosen, since the maximum regret for policy 1 is 18 whereas for policy 2 it is 1. The reason why minimax regret chooses a different model than minimax is that under model 1, both policies lead to similar losses, whereas under model 2, the losses are quite different.
This example illustrates a key source of the appeal of minimax regret, namely, the criterion "normalizes" policy comparisons to account for the fact that certain realizations of the unknown state of nature (in our case, the correct model) are associated with relatively high losses regardless of the policy choice. In the language of classical decision theory, minimax regret has the virtue that it subtracts off for the loss associated with each candidate action the inevitable loss associated with a particular model, i.e. the loss under the model-specific optimal rule.
One objection to the minimax regret criterion is that decisionmaking under it is not required to obey the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), something first shown in Chernoff (1954) . It is not clear that this axiom is appropriate for policy decisions, as opposed to individual ones. Without focusing on the individual/policymaker distinction, we can see reasons why the axiom may not be natural. The axiom in essence states that one's preferences over different pairs of actions does not depend on the context in which they are made, where the total choice set is part of the context. This is not an obvious requirement of rationality. 13 In absence of the 12 After writing this paper, we discovered Eozenou, Rivas and Schlag (2006) who provide a brief application of minimax regret to a question in economic growth to illustrate methods the authors have developed and as such is a macroeconomic example. 13 Blume, Easley, and Halperin (2006) argue, for example, that an appropriate axiomatization of rationality should not require that agents have preferences which obey certain consistency conditions over all possible states of the world, as is required by axiom, there do exist coherent axiom systems that produce minimax regret as the standard for evaluation; Stoye (2006) is the state of the art treatment. We note that in Stoye's system, for example, minimax regret obeys a weakened version of IIA called independence of nonoptimal alternatives, which means that the introduction or removal of a possible choice that is never the optimal one for any state of nature, will not matter in comparing the other choices.
We do not predicate our interest in minimax regret as a method of comparing policies on a strong adherence to any particular argument against the IIA assumption.
We report minimax comparisons in addition to minimax regret comparisons to see where the criteria differ in practice. As will be apparent, minimax regret and minimax produced qualitatively similar results. We do not interpret this as indicating that one of the criteria is redundant, rather we feel it reinforces our general conclusions.
Frequency-specific effects of policies
In this section we consider rule performance with respect to fluctuations at different frequencies. Standard analyses of the effects of policies focus on weighted averages of the unconditional variances of the states and possibly the controls. Hence, it is common to compare policies by considering, for example, a weighted average of the unconditional variances of inflation and unemployment. Such calculations thus mask the effects of policies on the variance of fluctuations at different frequencies. Brock and Durlauf (2004, 2005) and argue that fundamental tradeoffs in the variance associated with different frequencies of state variables can arise for macroeconomic contexts of the type conventionally studied. We describe these tradeoffs for a one dimensional system
Savage, but rather that rationality requires certain consistency conditions only over states under consideration. While they do not explicitly pursue this approach as a critique of irrelevance of independent alternatives, their work can be used to justify its exclusion as a rationality requirement.
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with feedback rule rules can achieve in terms of frequency-by-frequency effects on the state by characterizing the set of sensitivity functions that are available to the policymaker. This is the key notion underlying the study of design limits for policy choice.
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It turns out that there is a simple way to characterize the sensitivity functions in univariate systems. For each specification of a model of the uncontrolled system M and a control C, it must be the case that the associated sensitivity function obeys
As discussed in 16 , if the system has no forwardlooking elements, i.e. 0 β ≡ , then the constraint depends only on the unstable autoregressive roots of the unconstrained system. The constraint equals 0 if there are no such roots, and is positive otherwise. The constraint is thus independent of the choice of control. Since
) cannot be less than 0 for all frequencies, it must be the case that ( ) 2 S ω cannot be less than 1 for all frequencies. Therefore, it is impossible to induce uniform reductions in the spectral density of the state variable relative to its value when there is no control, i.e. reductions at some frequencies require increases at others.
Of course, the overall variance may be reduced.
The results are more complicated for forward-looking systems. When , it is possible for a rule to reduce the variance of the state at all frequencies, although whether this is possible will depend on the values of the polynomials in (8).
Brock, Durlauf and Rondina (2007) show that a variance-minimizing rule may increase variance at some frequencies, even when a uniform reduction at all frequencies is possible.
0,1) β ∈ (
Should a central bank evaluate rules on the basis of frequency specific effects?
One reason why a central bank should do so concerns problems of measuring low frequency components of state variables, which is discussed in Onatski and Williams (2003) . 17 Low frequency behavior is of course hard to identify. Such measurement problems take on particular importance if it is believed that long-run movements in the data are those outside the control of the central bank. Brock, Durlauf, Nason, and Rondina (2007) pursue this issue with respect to the effects on policy evaluation of alternative detrending methods. 18 The issue concerns integrating spectral densities to compute losses, not to detrend data. In which case, the argument does not justify use of ad hoc filters.
A second argument for considering frequency-specific effects is based on nonseparable preferences. Under nonseparable preferences, a policymaker assigns different weights to different frequencies to calculate expected welfare. Otrok (2001) has a useful example where the weights on different frequencies can differ by more than 9:1.
According to Otrok, if preferences exhibit habit persistence the loss associated with volatility at high frequencies is greater than the loss associated with volatility at low frequencies.
Otrok's results suggest that the study of frequency-specific losses may be important in understanding the role of preference uncertainty in evaluating policy rules.
We can imagine two levels where such uncertainty exists. First, an analyst may not be certain about the preferences of a policymaker; hence he will want to report frequencyspecific effects so that his findings may be used by policymakers with different preferences. Second, a policymaker who is uncertain about public preferences over, say, inflation and the output gap, may wish to account for this uncertainty in evaluating policy, i.e. to account for lack of knowledge of whether or not these preferences are separable. In this case, a policymaker will want to understand how losses occur for a policy at different frequencies.
The upshot of this discussion is that we believe part of the communication exercise for policymakers should involve reporting frequency specific comparisons.
Model uncertainty and monetary policy evaluation: some illustrations
In this section, we consider two analyses of rule of thumb versus optimal policies where model uncertainty is present. We follow Levin and Williams (2003) forward-looking models represents the modern instantiation of disagreements over the nature of the Phillips curve that helped launch the rational expectations revolution.
In our analysis, we consider a univariate system where inflation rate t π is controlled by the output gap . Model-specific optimal rules will be constructed on the basis of assuming a particular law of motion for the inflation rate and the intertemporal loss function
This corresponds to an "inflation nutter" in that volatility in the control variable is not considered. In subsequent work we consider richer loss functions, notably ones where the volatility of the control also matters, but this one is useful in illustrating our main ideas.
a. theory uncertainty: backwards-versus forward-looking models
We first consider the evaluation of policies when model uncertainty is represented by alternative forward-looking and backwards-looking theories of inflation. Our model space thus contains two candidates. The first is a backwards-looking model
The optimal feedback rule for this model is shown in the Technical Appendix 
This is the same as the optimal feedback rule that minimizes the unconditional variance of the state. Notice that when the disturbance is not white noise the optimal rule will contain lagged state variables.
Our alternative forward-looking model is
The optimal feedback rule ( ) is shown in the Technical Appendix to be In addition to and we consider two additional rules. The first is a rule of thumb (
where, in addition to the negative sign, our choice of the coefficient f is such that the policy instrument is reacting to innovations in the inflation series more than one for one. 20 Second, we consider a restricted optimal rule ( F RO ) for the forward-looking model, by which we mean rules restricted to the form t y f t π = in which the parameter f 20 In this sense there is an analogy with the celebrated "Taylor principle" for monetary policy rules. The Taylor principle is defined in contexts where the policy rule is a nominal interest rate rule and the interest rate responds more than one for one to inflation. This ensures that when inflation increases the real interest rate increases because of the policy reaction. Thus, our focus on a single-equation model for inflation where the output gap is the policy instrument makes the analogy with the Taylor principle a loose one. The key property for our rule of thumb is that the instrument "leans against the wind" and that this reaction is relatively strong. 
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We study a rule of thumb motivated by uncertainty about the backwards-versus forward-looking specifications (13) and (15) Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) preferred estimate of the slope in the backwards-looking Phillips Curve of .14. Although there is uncertainty surrounding the value of slope of alternative Phillips curve specifications (for example, Gali and Gertler (1999) suggest an estimate for the backwards-looking PC slope of 0.081 while they propose a range for the NKPC in 0.015 and 0.037), we believe that fixing the slope in each Phillips Curve equation at .1 is appropriate in order to allow us to focus on the uncertainty with respect to the presence of the backwards-looking versus forward-looking elements of the state dynamics. model (13) is true. close to , which has a total variance equal to the normalized variance of the shock .
In contrast, performs poorly generating a total variance nearly four times larger.
The frequency intervals contain information that explains the poor performance of the rule for the backwards-looking model (13). Across the frequency intervals 
The roots of the polynomial in the denominator of (19) are
The discriminant
is negative given our calibrations, which yields complex conjugate roots for the polynomial in the denominator of the MA process (19). In this case, the spectral density of the state produces a peak at business cycle frequencies.
In contrast, O is removed, another rule becomes the best choice among the candidate rule for the forwardlooking case and so alters the regret calculations. Our comparisons all fulfill the independence of nonoptimal alternatives criterion described above. (13) and (15) 
here ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
respectively. For the rule of thumb, the solution for the state is an AR(1) process
where
n we study. These conditions hold for the calibratio The model-specific optimal rule induces a law of motion for the state of the form 
hen the policymaker employs a misspecified model. This representation is neither unique nor bounded unless restrictions are imposed in the roots of the autoregressive olynomial. This polynomial can be rewritten as
A sufficient condition for a unique and bounded solution is
24 which we assume. The solution is again an ARMA(2,1)
1, 24 The presence of on the right hand side of (32) is the source of potential nonin th 0 G uniqueness, while the possibility of a root at the denominator polynomial bigger than one absolute value is e source of potential unboundedness. Following Whiteman (1983) , the term 0 G is chosen so that the unstable autoregressive root ( ) . Note that the rational expectations equilibrium exists, is unique and bounded in all the exercises discussed below. . The dashed lines denote variance generated by the OB rule, while the RoT variances are solid lines in Figure 3 . Figure 3 -a shows that the OB rule always yields smaller total variance pointwise across the model space. As Table 5 and the associated panels in Figure 3 suggest, the same is true on the 3 , 4 Contrast this with results reported in Table 1 and Figure 1 that the RoT dominates the optimal forward-looking rule, F O , when 1 θ = . The source of the disparate results is that the optim ark rule is constructed under the assump al benchm OB tion that 0.5 θ = . This assump true mo unlike the exercises reported in Table 1 and Figure 1 that do not combine the competing atter tion minimizes deviations from the del and hence model uncertainty, models.
Model uncertainty continues to m once policy is evaluated across the entire spectrum for a fixed θ . In this case, the sup ity of OB rule is derived from its ability to reduce fluctuations in t erior the π at the high frequencies. This indicates that outcomes under the OB rule and the RoT are sensitive to the equency intervals on which les ar red. fr these ru e compa Thus, policy evaluation becomes more difficult once it is recognized that model and preference uncertainty can interact.
We conclude this section by noting that there is evidence for the policymaker to choose the OB e over the rul RoT . However, this result rests on certainty about the policymaker's loss function (i.e., total variance). Our exercises acknowledge model uncertainty along the lines of backwards-versus forward-looking elements, but this e the
In this paper, we have attempted to illustrate how the case for optimal policy rules ance of the rules in the presence of model ific effects. These two dimensions interact al rules to go awry seems especially great for particular frequency-specific intervals. This uncertainty plays a secondary role because of the simplicity of our economic model. Nonetheless, our results indicat need for policy evaluation to account for preference uncertainty with the same effort that is dedicated to model uncertainty.
Summary and conclusions
is weakened when one considers the perform uncertainty and with respect to frequency-spec as we observe that the potential for optim suggests to us that great caution should be taken in seriously advocating a policy that is optimal with respect to an environment, using the standard variance-based loss function. While we are not so nihilistic as to believe such knowledge is impossible, we believe that it is often the case that contemporaneous scholarly discussions of macroeconomic policy pay too little attention to Friedman's 1948 arguments. Indeed, our analysis is more interventionist than his in that our simple rules are versions of leaning against the wind policies, which Friedman specifically questions because of the problem of long and variable lags in policy effects.
We do not think it unfair to say that modern time series analysis has led to a more optimistic view of the information available to policymakers than assumed by 27
Friedman.
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Hence, we are comfortable with recommendations that are more interventionist than his.
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A major weakness in our analysis is that we focus on comparisons of permanent rule choices. In other words, we ask whether a policymaker should permanently prefer one rule or the other, without allowing for the possibility that the policymaker will learn about the nature of model uncertainty over time. While this is the standard procedure in most of the monetary rules literature, the analysis fails to address how a rule should be chosen when the policymaker has the option of changing it in response to new information that affects the model space under consideration. One solution is suggested by Svensson and Williams (2005) who treat different models as regimes across which the economy switches; in their analysis the model uncertainty facing a policymaker is equivalent to uncertainty about the regime in which the economy is currently in as the conditional probabilities of future regimes given the current regime state. This is a promising research direction and admits progress using Markov jump process methods, but it treats model uncertainty in a very different way than we conceptualize it. In our view, model uncertainty represents something that may be resolved over time, not something that exists in a steady state. Hence the next step in the approach we take seems likely to draw from ideas from the theory of bandit problems rather than from the theory of Markov jump processes. Further, both approaches to model uncertainty cannot address the issue of policy evaluation when new elements emerge in the model space over time. This problem begins to link monetary policy evaluation with issues that lie at the frontiers of the work on decisionmaking under ambiguity, where even the most advanced treatment typically assumes that while the probabilities are not available for the object of interest, its support is known.
Finally, we observe that our frequency-specific results suggest that a systematic examination of preference uncertainty is an important complement to the analysis of model uncertainty. Our findings that rules that are optimal with respect to overall variance mask frequency tradeoffs, even when there is no model uncertainty, suggests a 25 In fact, Friedman (1972) acknowledges some progress of this type, although worry about politicization preserves his skepticism of countercyclical monetary policy. 26 As such, we are sympathetic to the common sense spirit of Blinder (1998) Therefore, we see this paper as only a first step in a long research program. Table 1 reports the loss measured by the unconditional variance of for the backwards-looking model of equation (13) under four alternative policy rules:
(Optimal Backwards) -the optimal rule of the backwards-looking model (equation (14));
(Optimal Forward) -the optimal rule of the forwardlooking model (equation (16) Table 2 reports the loss measured by the unconditional variance of for forward-looking model of equation (15) under four alternative policy rules:
(Optimal Forward) -the optimal rule of the forwardlooking model (equation (16) Table 3 reports the maximum losses across the backwards-and forward-model models from the entries reported in Table 1 and in Table 2 for the four alternative policy rules , , and RoT . Column (1) reports the maximum loss across the entire frequency range, columns (2)-(7) report the maximum loss generated at relevant frequency intervals. The entries in bold indicate the minima of the maximum losses in each of the columns. The bottom row of Table 3 reports the minimax policy strategies, i.e. the rules that would ensure at most the minimum of the maximum losses. Table 4 reports losses for the regret defined by equation (6) using the backwards-and forward-looking models under four alternative policy rules: (Optimal Backwards) -the optimal rule of the backwardslooking model (equation (14)); (Optimal Forward) -the optimal rule of the forward-looking model (equation (16) The regrets are computed from the entries in Table 1 and Table 2 . Column (1) reports the maximum regret from the losses across the entire frequency range, columns (2)-(7) report the maximum regret from the losses generated at relevant frequency intervals. The entries in bold indicate the minima of the maximum regrets in each of the columns. The bottom part of Table 4 reports the minimax-regret policy strategies, i.e. the rules that would ensure at most the minimum of the maximum regrets. Table 5 reports the loss measured by the unconditional variance of for the hybrid model of equation (22) . The bold entries denote the minima of the maximum losses and of the maximum regrets across the two policies. The last two rows report the minimax policy strategy and the minimax regret policy strategy, respectively. Column (1) reports the loss and maximum regret measured with respect to the entire frequency range, columns (2)- (7) (13) is true under four alternative policy rules: (a) (Optimal Forward) -the optimal rule of the forward-looking model of equation (16) 
The top panel of Figure 3 reports the total unconditional variance for for the hybrid model of equation (22) t . The bottom left and bottom right panels report spectral densities for the two alternative policy rules given the models are and , respectively. .25 θ = .75 θ =
